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Introduction 
There are three Regional Economic Communities (REC) in Africa, namely, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Commission (EAC) and 
the South African Development Community (SADC). The Regional Economic Communities 
(REC) were created to advance economic integration in their respective Communities. 
Regional economic integration occurs when a group of countries come together and develop 
a formal agreement (by way of treaties) regarding how they will conduct trade with each 
other.1 Each REC has a tribunal established in terms of a constituent treaty i.e. a treaty that 
deals with economic integration issues emanating from their respective sub-regions. The 
tribunals established under each REC are the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), the 
Southern African Development Community Tribunal (SADC Tribunal), and the Economic 
Community of West African States Community Court of Justice (the ECCJ).  
 
The tribunals are responsible, inter alia, for interpreting and applying treaty provisions in 
order to resolve disputes arising from their respective sub-regions.2 As such, they are 
instrumental in promoting regional integration on the African continent. Though the REC 
tribunals were established to advance economic integration, they are also seen as a tool that 
adds value to the protection of human rights.  
 
Chidi Odinkalu argues that there is a nexus between the objectives of regional integration and 
the realisation of human rights.3 Chidi Odinkalu further argues that there should be an 
integration that aims to protect universal human rights across the globe and not only at sub-
regional level as human rights are universal and important.4 Odinkalu’s argument 
demonstrates the extent to which human rights are important internationally. Notably, 
international instruments containing human rights provisions are amongst others the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD, 21 December, 
1965) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 16 December, 1966), 
                                                          
1 Jephias MapuvaI; Loveness Muyengwa-MapuvaII, The SADC regional bloc: What challenges and prospects 
for regional integration?, (2014), Vol.18  ,Page 1 
2 Frans Viljoen, Contemporary challenges to international human rights law and the role of human rights 
education, (2011), Vol 15, Page 485. 
3 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, PhD Thesis, 'Regional integration and human rights in Africa', London School of 
Economics, (2008). 
4 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, PhD Thesis, 'Regional integration and human rights in Africa', London School of 
Economics, (2008). 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 16 December, 
1966), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW, 18 December, 1979), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT, 10 December, 1984), Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC, 20 November, 1989), International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW, 18 
December, 1990), International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (CPED, 20 December, 2006) and  Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD, 13 December, 2006).5 Scholars such as Oliver Ruppel assert that human 
rights coupled with good governance create an appropriate investment climate that is critical 
to furthering economic development.6 
 
Economic growth is instrumental for the realization of human rights and should be achieved 
in a manner consistent with human rights principles.7 Frans Viljoen is of the view that the 
heart of sub-regional integration would be in vain if it does not provide a lifeline protection 
for human rights.8 Viljoen further believes that ceding sovereignty to intergovernmental 
arrangements has value to the nationals of states concerned only if the sub-regional space 
allows human rights to prosper in ways that were impossible in the nation state. Economic 
growth is instrumental for the realization of human rights and vice versa. Economic growth 
must also be achieved in a manner consistent with human rights principles.9 
 
                                                          
5 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD, 21 December, 1965); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 16 December, 1966);  
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 16 December, 1966); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 18 December, 1979);  
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT, 10 
December, 1984); 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 20 November, 1989);  
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (ICMW, 18 December, 1990)  
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED, 20 
December, 2006) and   
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, 13 December, 2006) 
6 Oliver Ruppel ,The SADC Tribunal, Regional Integration and Human Rights: Major Challenges, Legal 
Dimension and some Comparative Aspects from the European Legal Order ,(2009), Page 213 
7 https://hrbaportal.org/faq/what-is-the-relationship-between-human-rights-and-economic-growth 
8Sisay Alemahu Yeshanew, African Human Rights Law Journal, (2011) Vol 11 No 2 Page 588, Par 28.  
9 https://hrbaportal.org/faq/what-is-the-relationship-between-human-rights-and-economic-growth 
HRBA Portal : UN Practitioners Portal on Human Rights Based Approach to Programming 
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This study seeks to contribute to international law as it investigates whether the REC have the 
mandate to adjudicate human rights matters, the extent of their mandate, as well as the link 
between the manner in which the mandate has developed and the success of the relevant 
tribunals in enforcing human rights. Lastly, this study seeks to recommend possible ways that 
can be used to improve REC tribunals mandate and the respective constituent documents.  
For the purposes of a comprehensive analysis of this topic, I have divided the analysis into 3 
chapters. Chapters 1 deals with the distinction between an express and implied mandate. 
Analysis of the REC tribunals’ mandate on human rights matters has been dealt with under 
this Chapter. Chapter 2 discusses the acceptance of the tribunals of a mandate in relation to 
human rights by member states and the effectiveness of the tribunals in exercising this 
mandate. Chapter 3 deals with a summary of the findings and makes recommendations for 
greater effectiveness of the tribunals in relation to their human rights mandate. I shall seek to 
show that the more express the mandate, the greater the effectiveness of the respective 
tribunals in addressing human rights issues. Nevertheless, effectiveness ultimately results 
from a commitment by states politically to abide by the decisions of the tribunal.  
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CHAPTER 1: The Distinction between Express and Implied Mandates 
1.1 Introduction 
Before we explore the REC’s tribunals’ human rights mandate, it is important to define and 
understand what a mandate or jurisdiction means. Jurisdiction refers to the power or 
competence of a tribunal to adjudicate over a legal dispute, and issue a binding judgement.10 
The REC tribunals derive competency from a constituent document that defines their powers, 
mandate and the extent to which they can exercise their powers.11 There are two types of 
mandates that are often exercised by the tribunals: namely, an express and an implied 
mandate. Prior to engaging in a discussion on the position of these tribunals on their human 
rights mandate and the effectiveness thereof, it is important to outline the difference between 
the two types of mandates mentioned above.  
 
1.2 The Distinction between an Express and an Implied Mandate 
 
1.2.1 Express Mandate 
Express powers refer to those powers that are explicitly conferred upon an organisation by 
state parties.12 The express powers are normally conferred on a particular tribunal through a 
constituent document which is a Treaty in the REC tribunals’ context. In terms of this type of 
mandate, an organization may only exercise the powers that are conferred on it by member 
states as explicitly contained in the constituent document.13         
            
 It is  common cause that where there is an express jurisdiction there tend to be less disputes 
concerning the mandate of the tribunal because the constituent documents make it clear as to 
what type of matters a tribunal can or cannot adjudicate. The advantage of using this type of 
mandate is that it saves the tribunals’ time and resources as the mandate is often not in 
dispute.  The ECCJ is a good example of a tribunal that has an explicit mandate. It has 
                                                          
10 Patrick Capps, Malcolm Evans and Stratos Konstadinidis, Asserting Jurisdiction, (2006), Page 536  
11 Bin Cheng, General Principles of law as applied by international courts and tribunals (2006), Page 259. 
12 ICJ Report: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, (1996), Page 226, para 25. 
13 Solomon T Ebobrah, Research Partnership 1: A critical analysis of the human rights mandate of the 
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, (2008)  
 http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf  
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effectively used this type of mandate in most of the human rights matters before it: for 
example, The SERAP vs Nigeria case.14 In this case, it was alleged that the government 
mismanaged funds that were allocated to ten states of the Federation of Nigeria for basic 
education. SERAP alleged that the government of Nigeria violated article 17 (1) of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.15 Article 17 (1) stipulates that every 
individual shall have the right to education. In this case, the issue of whether the ECCJ 
possesses jurisdiction to hear the matter or not was dealt with as part of the court 
proceedings.16 Nigeria argued that the ECCJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter as the case 
dealt with domestic human rights laws and policy which are not within the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court.17  On the substantive issue of jurisdiction, the Court held that it is 
well established that the rights guaranteed by the African Charter are justiciable before the 
Court.18 The Court held that it clearly has jurisdiction to adjudicate on applications 
concerning the violation of human rights that occur in Member States of ECOWAS that 
emanates from African Charter on Human Rights and People’s Rights in terms of article 4(g) 
of the ECOWAS Treaty.19 Article 4 of the ECOWAS Treaty provides that “the high 
contracting parties, in pursuit of the objectives stated in article 3 of this Treaty, solemnly 
affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles: recognition, promotion and 
protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights”.20  Deciding the merits of the case, the Court held 
that the Nigerian government should take necessary steps and make resources available to 
ensure that there is a proper implementation of the education programme in the country.  
 
The ECCJ made its position clear on the issue of having explicit jurisdiction to adjudicate 
human rights matters emanating from its treaty and from the African Charter in the case 
                                                          
14 The Registered Trustees of the Socio-economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v Nigeria 
ECW/CCJ/APP  
15 The Registered Trustees of the Socio-economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v Nigeria 
ECW/CCJ/APP 
16 Article 17 (1) of the Banjul Charter  
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf  
17 The Registered Trustees of the Socio-economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v Nigeria 
ECW/CCJ/APP  
18 The Registered Trustees of the Socio-economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v Nigeria 
ECW/CCJ/APP 
https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2010/socio-economic-rights-and-accountability-project-serap-v-federal-
republic-nigeria-and 
19 Article 4(g) of the ECOWAS Treaty 
20 Article 4(g) of the ECOWAS Treaty 
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above. The ECCJ pronounced on the above case that its scope of jurisdiction extends to 
accommodate violation of human rights emanating not only from its treaty but from the 
African Charter as well. 
 
The most important question that one should ask regarding an express human rights mandate 
is that if an  express power is given to a tribunal does that mean that the tribunal cannot 
exercise another power which is not provided for expressly in the constituent document? This 
question lead us to discuss the other type of the mandate, namely, an implied mandate. This 
type of mandate is an alternative mandate that the court normally has to adjudicate violations 
of human rights matters. 
 
1.2.2 Implied Mandate  
Unlike an express mandate that is conferred on an organisation by the constitution or treaty 
establishing a particular organisation, an implied mandate is not written in a constituent 
document. It is not always the case that the treaties establishing the tribunals are precise with 
regards to the mandate that an organisation possess.21 In circumstances where the tribunal’s 
constituent document is silent or ambiguous, courts often resort to using the notion of an 
implied mandate. The standard for the use of an implied mandate is to consider whether the 
exercise of an implied power would be necessary to achieve the purpose for which the 
organisation is created.22 The implied powers and the extent to which the organisation 
performs this type of mandate are determined by the purpose for which the court is created. 
However, the notion of an implied mandated has generated opposition. Lucyline Nkatha 
Murungi asserts that utilising an implied mandate affects the response of the parties to the 
decision rendered.23 Murungi further argues that if such a decision is deemed to exceed the 
power of the court, it is unlikely to be enforced effectively.24 I disagree, however, with this 
view as I believe implied mandates are necessary to ensure that the purposes of a treaty – and 
a consequent tribunal - are fulfilled: it is never possible fully to specify all the details that are 
                                                          
https://africanlii.org/article/20180823/bring-back-sadc-tribunal-says-judge 
 
22 Krzysztof  Skubiszewski, ‘Implied Powers of International Organisations : in International Law at a Time of 
Perplexity, (1989), Page 885; 860 
23 Lucyline Nkatha Murungi, Revisiting the role of sub-regional courts in the protection of human rights in 
Africa, 2009, Page 33 
24 Lucyline Nkatha Murungi, Revisiting the role of sub-regional courts in the protection of human rights in 
Africa, 2009, Page 33 
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necessary for the effective operation thereof. 25 An implied mandate also gives an opportunity 
to an aggrieved party to gain access to justice despite the tribunal not having an express 
mandate as long as the adjudication fulfils the objectives for which the court is created. In a 
majority of human rights matters, the tribunals had to decide the issue of jurisdiction by way 
of interlocutory procedure. Incidental jurisdiction refers to the power of a tribunal to decide a 
dispute as to its own jurisdiction in a given case.  
 
The REC tribunals have recently been seen to have utilised the notion of an implied mandate 
in relation to the violation of human rights.26 It cannot be ignored that like any other mandate 
there are challenges attached to this type of mandate. One of the major challenges that the 
REC tribunals faced was exercising an implied mandate against the States that have not 
ratified the constituent treaties. REC tribunals have been seen to have resolved the challenge 
by assuming an implied jurisdiction over cases of violations of human rights emanating from 
the African Banjul Charter provisions.  
 
1.3 REC tribunals’ position on implied and express mandates 
1.3.1 EACJ 
The EAC protocol is ambiguous in conferring an explicit human rights mandates to the 
EACJ.27 The current EAC Treaty in article 27 (2) provides that “the court shall have such 
other original, appellate, human rights, and other jurisdiction as will be determined by the 
Council at a suitable subsequent date. To this end, the partner states shall conclude a protocol 
to operationalize the extended jurisdiction”.28 The Council has not officially passed the EAC 
Bill of Rights that will confer a human rights mandate on the EACJ and, therefore, at this 
stage the Court remains without an express mandate to adjudicate human rights matters. The 
EACJ has used an implied mandate to adjudicate human rights matters i.e. in the Katabazi 
and Ariviza case. In Katabazi v Secretary General of the East African Community, the 
claimants allegedly committed treason and were in 2004 kept in custody in Uganda.29 In 
November 2016, the claimants were granted bail by the High Court of Uganda; however, they 
                                                          
25 Lucyline Nkatha  Murungi, Revisiting the role of sub-regional courts in the protection of human rights in 
Africa, 2009, Page 33 
26 Lucyline Murungi, Revisiting the role of sub-regional courts in the protection of human rights in Africa, 2009, 
Page 33 
27 https://africanlii.org/article/20180823/bring-back-sadc-tribunal-says-judge 
28 Article 27 of the Treaty of the EAC, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/eac/trt_eac.pdf 
29 Katabazi v Secretary General of the East African Community (Ref No 1 of 2007) 2007 EACJ 3 (1 November 
2007) 
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were arrested again and detained on the same day after intervention by the Ugandan Military. 
The claimants approached the Court seeking relief to enforce the High Court of Uganda’s 
decision to grant them bail and to stop the military of Uganda from interfering with their 
liberty of movement. The matter was then brought before the EACJ’s attention for 
adjudication.  
 
The applicant brought the matter under article 6(d) of the African Charter alleging that the 
human rights enshrined in the EAC Treaty principles under article 7 (2) have been violated.30  
Article 7(2) mandates Member States to abide by principles inter alia of the rule of law and 
universally accepted standards of human rights.31 The Attorney General of the Republic of 
Uganda challenged the EACJ’s mandate to deal with human rights matters and based his 
claim on the basis that the EACJ Treaty does not explicitly confer the mandate to adjudicate 
human rights matters on the Court and that the proposed protocol that is underway is still a 
bill and not yet approved. The argument raised by the Ugandan government was that the 
Court had, at that stage, no written mandate to adjudicate human rights matters.  
 
They raised another argument as well that the matter is not confined within the Court’s 
mandate as the provisions of the African Charter and human rights falls outside the scope of 
article 27 (1) & (2) of the EAC Treaty.32 Article 27 (1) states that the Court shall initially 
have jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of this Treaty, provided that the 
Court’s jurisdiction to interpret under this paragraph shall not include the application of any 
such interpretation to jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of Partner States whereas 
article 27 (2) states that the Court shall have such original, appellate, human rights and other 
jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable subsequent date.33 To this end, 
the Partner States shall conclude a protocol to operationalise the extended jurisdiction. The 
EACJ, however, confirmed that it does have jurisdiction over human rights matters despite 
the fact that the claimants sought relief based on the African Charter which arguably falls 
under the envisaged human rights jurisdiction to be conferred on the Court in future. 34 The 
Court concluded that it could hear a claim brought by 'residents of the East African 
Community alleging that a partner state has committed acts that violate the provisions of the 
                                                          
30 Article 7(2) of the EAC Treaty 
31 Katabazi v Secretary General of the East African Community (Ref No 1 of 2007) 2007 EACJ 3  
32 Article 27 (1) and (2) of the EAC Treaty  
33 Article 27 (2) of the EAC Treaty 
34 Ariviza & Another v AG Kenya & Others Application 3 of 2010 
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Treaty'.35 The Court’s rationale was that it possess an implied mandate despite the fact that 
the Council mentioned in article 27 (2) of the EAC treaty has not determined the human 
rights and other jurisdiction at a suitable subsequent date yet. The Council of Ministers have 
the authority to set the Agenda and to make decisions by consensus. The EACJ human rights 
mandate is still subject to the protocol that is yet to be established by the Council to extend 
the human rights mandate. The above case raises another debatable argument that is crucial 
under international human rights law. The argument arising from Katabazi’s case is whether 
the principles enshrined in human rights treaties are binding or not? Does the stipulation of 
principles in the constituent document automatically confer a human right’s mandate on a 
particular court? From the decision taken in Katabazi’s case it appears that the court takes 
principles of the treaties as binding. However, I differ with the approach taken in Katabazi’s 
case and argue that the principles under international treaties are more guidelines and 
therefore should never be considered as binding. The enactment of the EACJ Bill will 
definitely resolve issues such as this in future as the mandate will be clear and unambiguous. 
Another good example where EACJ confirmed that it possesses a human rights mandate is 
the case of Ariviza and Another v AG, Kenya and Others.36 In this case, the claimant 
brought the matter before the EACJ seeking relief to declare the process that was followed in 
promulgating a new constitution in Kenya in conflict with the EAC Treaty provisions and 
void. The claim was brought under articles 5(1), 6(c), 7(2), 8(1) (c), 27(1) of the EAC Treaty 
as well as articles 1, 3, 7(1) and 9(2) of the African Charter.37 In this case, the respondents 
challenged the mandate of the EACJ and filed an objection on the basis that the matter is 
beyond EACJ mandate and therefore falls outside article 27 (1) of the EAC Treaty.38 The 
Court came to the conclusion that it could hear a claim brought by 'residents of the East 
African Community alleging that a partner state has committed acts that violate the 
provisions of the Treaty'.39 In deciding the above, the EACJ was consistent with the approach 
taken in Katabazi case that it would not shy away from interpreting and applying the Treaty 
                                                          
35Ariviza & Another v AG Kenya & Others Application 3 of 2010 
36 Ariviza v. Attorney General of Kenya, Application 3 of 2010, Ruling (EACJ, Feb. 23, 2011) 
37Ariviza & Another v AG Kenya & Others Application 3 of 2010. 
Article 5 (1),6 (c) , 7 (2), 8 (1) (c) , 27 (1)  of the EAC Treaty  
Article 9 (2) of the African Charter 
38Ariviza & Another v AG Kenya & Others Application 3 of 2010. 
39 Ariviza & Another v AG Kenya & Others Application 3 of 2010 
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merely because claims of a human rights nature were included in an action.40 The EACJ has 
therefore clearly accepted an implied human rights mandate.  Solomon Ebobrah is of the 
view that the EACJ appears to be taking a somewhat activist posture to claim jurisdiction in 
matters that touch on human rights issues.41 Ebobrah asserts that the EACJ and the SADC 
Tribunal have no clear competence over human rights but are not deterred from using the 
implied mandate.42 Murungi also demonstrates that in the absence of an express competence, 
REC courts have not been deterred from exercising jurisdiction over human rights 
questions.43 
Both Katabazi and Ariviza speaks a lot about article 27 of the EAC Treaty which is the most 
important section dealing with the suspension of the EACJ human rights jurisdiction. 
However, the effort to try to get a court order to make the Council accelerate the process of 
enacting the Bill has been made in the case of Sitenda Sebalu v Secretary General of EAC 
and Others without success. The case addresses the delay caused by the Council of Ministers 
to pass the protocol that will extend the human rights jurisdiction to EACJ under article 27 
(2) of the EAC Treaty. In 2006, the Applicant took part in the Parliamentary elections 
contesting for the seat of Member of Parliament for Kyadondo East Constituency in Wakiso 
District, in Uganda.44 The applicant unfortunately lost the election. The applicant was not 
satisfied with the results of the election and decided to challenge the outcomes of the 
elections in the in the High Court, the Court of Appeal and eventually he ended up in the 
Supreme Court, which is the highest Court in Uganda, but he was unsuccessful in all those 
Courts.45 Having exhausted the local courts, he wanted to appeal to the East African Court of 
Justice (EACJ), but realized that the EACJ lacked the jurisdiction to entertain appeals from 
the national courts of the EAC Partner States.46 He then filed a motion in the case of Sitenda 
Sebalu v The Secretary General of the East African Community against The Attorney 
General of the Republic of Uganda, Hon. Sam Njuba and the Electoral Commission of 
                                                          
40
 Katabazi and 21 Others v Secretary General of the East African Community and Another, (Ref. No. 1 of 
2007) EACJ 3  
41Solomon T Ebobrah, African Human Right Law Journal No 1: The AU Convention for the Protection and 
Assistance of Internally-Displaced Persons was adopted in 2009 and is yet to enter into force, (2011),Vol 11 
42 Solomon T Ebrobrah, African Journal of International and Comparative Law: Litigating human rights before 
sub-regional courts in Africa -prospects and challenges (2009), Vol,  17 Issue 1, Page (79-101),  
43Lucyline Murungi Revisiting the role of sub-regional courts in the protection of human rights in Africa(2009) 
Page 33 
44 Sitenda Sebalu v Secretary General of EAC and Others Reference No : 8 of 2012, EACJ  
45 Sitenda Sebalu v Secretary General of EAC and Others Reference No : 8 of 2012, EACJ 
46 Sitenda Sebalu v Secretary General of EAC and Others Reference No : 8 of 2012, EACJ 
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Uganda.47 In that application, the Applicant’s main complaint was that, although article 27(2) 
of the Treaty provides for conferment on the EACJ, such other original, appellate, human 
rights and other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable subsequent 
date, none of those additional limbs of jurisdiction had been conferred on the EACJ by the 
Council yet.48  The Applicant’s specific grievance against the Secretary General was that , 
being the Chief Executive Officer(CEO) of the Community, he is mandated by the Treaty, to 
convene the Council of Ministers so that they may conclude a protocol to operationalise the 
extended jurisdiction of the EACJ in order to handle inter alia appeals from the final appellate 
courts of the Partner States and that the said protocol had been pending action since 4th May, 
2005 as a Draft Protocol to operationalise The Extended Jurisdiction of the EACJ.49 Despite 
that mandate, he had failed to do so and for that reason, the Applicant invited the Court in 
that Reference, to inter alia, interpret articles 5, 6(d),7(2) and 8(1)(c) of the Treaty so as to 
determine whether the delay to vest the EACJ with appellate jurisdiction was a contravention 
of the doctrines and principles of good governance, including adherence to the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law, social justice and the maintenance of universally acceptable 
standards of human rights which are enshrined in the Treaty and which the Partner States 
undertook to abide by.50 He contended further that the rule of law requires that public affairs 
are conducted in accordance with the law; that the decisions of the courts can be appealed 
against; and that “the continuous delay to establish the East African Court of Appeal as 
stipulated by article 27 of the Treaty is a blatant violation of the rule of law and contrary to 
the Treaty and East African integration”.51 One of the excuses provided for  the delay in 
passing the protocol to extend the EACJ human rights mandate was that human rights is the 
domain of national jurisdictions and therefore the national institutions should deal with 
violation of human rights matters pending the finalisation of the protocol.52  
The Court held that “the National Courts have the primary obligation to promote and protect 
human rights”.53 The Court looked at the following legal questions to arrive at the decision 
stated above: The first legal question was supposing human rights abuses are perpetrated on 
citizens and the State in question shows reluctance unwillingness or inability to redress the 
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abuse, wouldn’t regional integration be threatened? The Court stated that the regional 
integration would definitely be threatened; The Second legal question was wouldn’t the wider 
interests of justice, therefore, demand that a window be created for aggrieved citizens in the 
Community Partner State concerned to access their own regional court, to wit, the EACJ, for 
redress? The Court was of the view that the wider interest of justice triggers a demand that a 
window be created for aggrieved citizens in the Community Partner State concerned to access 
their own regional court, to wit, the EACJ, for redress.54  
With regards to whether or not the Court can impose an obligation to pass the protocol, the 
Court held that indeed it is not for the Court to dictate to the Council of Ministers how to 
carry out its functions under the doctrine of separation of powers.55 Even though the Court 
faulted the Council for delaying the passing of the protocol that will extend human rights 
jurisdiction to the EACJ, the Court left the role of determining the jurisdiction of the Court to 
the Council of Ministers as the policy organ of the Community.56  The Court is a judicial 
body and not a Policy body of the EAC Community, which is why it shy away from 
imposing the obligation to the Council to pass the protocol.57 The role of the Court as the 
judicial body of the Community, is to ensure adherence to law in the interpretation and 
application and compliance with the Treaty.58 The decision to delay the protocol seems to be 
a political one than a technical one as the decision to quicken the process to pass the protocol 
was supposed to be driven by the interests of the Member States which at this moment is not 
happening.  
1.3.2 SADC Tribunal 
The SADC Tribunal was established in terms of article 9 (g) read with article 16 of the 
SADC treaty and became operational in November 2006. Article 16 states that “the tribunal 
shall be constituted to ensure adherence to the proper interpretation of the provisions of the 
SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments, and to adjudicate such disputes referred to it”.59 
Even though the SADC tribunal was established to deal with economic integration happening 
within the SADC Community, it also accepted a case dealing with an alleged violation of 
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human rights.60 Originally, the powers to deal with economic integration matters, the 
interpretation and application of the treaty were conferred on the SADC Tribunal by member 
states through the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on the Tribunal and Rules thereof.61 The 
SADC Protocol was silent, however, on whether or not the SADC Tribunal has jurisdiction or 
not to adjudicate violations of human rights. The SADC Tribunal's jurisdiction is provided 
for in article 14 of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal. The SADC Tribunal protocol 
indicates that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over all disputes that relate inter alia to the 
interpretation and application of the SADC Treaty.62  
 
The SADC Treaty makes reference to human rights in its preamble and this has resulted in 
confusion on whether the Tribunal has a human rights mandate or not. The SADC Treaty 
preamble contains the following clause: “mindful of the need to involve the people of the 
Region centrally in the process of development and integration, particularly through the 
guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law”.63 It is, 
however, unclear as to whether the principles laid down as part of the Preamble are binding 
on the SADC Tribunal or not. The answer to this question was answered in the case of 
Campbell which will be discussed below.    
In the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe, the government of 
Zimbabwe appropriated the applicant’s farm and his private property as part of its 
programme of land reform.64 That action led Mr Campbell to file an application to restrain 
the government of Zimbabwe from evicting him from his property. The matter was brought 
before the SADC Tribunal under article 28 of the SADC Treaty. Article 28 of the SADC 
Treaty provides that “Member States undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the 
achievement of the objectives of SADC, and shall refrain from taking any measure likely to 
jeopardise the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of its objectives and the 
implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.” 65  
In 2008, the SADC Tribunal found that Mr Campbell and 78 other farmers were deprived of 
their land without the right of access to courts and the right to a fair hearing. Furthermore, the 
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Tribunal found that the government of Zimbabwe was in breach of the provisions of the 
SADC Treaty relating to farmers’ economic freedom and property rights.66 The challenging 
part about the Campbell case is the question regarding the tribunal’s mandate on human 
rights matters. Since the SADC Treaty only refers to the human rights as part of the 
principles and objectives, does that mean that the Tribunal has the mandate to deal with 
human rights matters in terms of the Treaty? 
 
In deciding this issue, the Tribunal first referred to article 21 (b) which, in addition to 
enjoining the Tribunal to develop its own jurisprudence, also instructs the Tribunal to do 
so “having regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public international 
law” which are sources of law for the Tribunal.67 That settles the question whether the 
Tribunal can look elsewhere to find answers where it appears that the Treaty is silent.68 In 
any event, I do not consider that there should first be a Protocol on human rights in order to 
give effect to the principles set out in the Treaty, in the light of the express provision of 
article 4 (c) of the Treaty which states that “SADC and Member States are required to act in 
accordance with the following principles – human rights, democracy and the rule of law”.69 
The Tribunal further held that it has jurisdiction in respect of any dispute concerning human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law, which are the very issues raised in the present 
application.  
1.3.3 ECCJ 
The ECCJ was established in terms of article 15 of the ECOWAS Treaty as the main judicial 
organ of the ECOWAS Community.70 Before the 2005 Protocol, the Court was focused on 
applying and interpreting the provisions of the founding treaty in dealing with economic 
integration until it was faced with the human rights case of Afolabi Olajide v Federal 
Republic of Nigeria in 2004.71 It was alleged that in August 2003, Mr Afolabi concluded a 
sale agreement with his customers in Benin to purchase certain goods with the condition that 
he will deliver the goods on an agreed date.72 Mr Afolabi embarked on a journey to deliver 
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the goods; however, when reaching Seme border that separates Nigeria and Benin, he found 
that the Border had been closed.73 The border was closed by the Nigeria Federal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs through a press statement.74 The Applicant, Mr. Olajide Afolabi could not 
proceed on his journey to Benin Republic despite his please to the security agents at the 
border about his contractual obligations in Benin.75 The rights alleged to have been violated 
are his right to free movement in terms of article 3 (2) (d) (iii) of the revised ECOWAS 
Treaty and the right to freedom of movement under the African Charter based on the 
provisions of article 4(g) of the revised ECOWAS Treaty.76 Article 3 (2) (d) (iii) of the 
revised protocol states that “in order to achieve the aims set out in the paragraph above, and 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Community shall, by stages, 
ensure the establishment of a common market through: the removal, between Member States, 
of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and to the right of 
residence and establishment”.77 Article 4 (g) states that the high contracting parties, in pursuit 
of the objectives stated in article 3 of this Treaty, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence 
to the following principles: recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' 
rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights”.78 The case raised issues around the question of individual access to the ECCJ.79 The 
ECCJ declined jurisdiction to adjudicate and declared that it lacks the mandate to adjudicate 
human rights matters. Declining the human rights jurisdiction in this case led to the 
amendment of the ECOWAS Treaty. 
 
The Supplementary Protocol (AP/SP.1/01/05) modified the ECOWAS Treaty and conferred 
on the ECCJ an express mandate to determine cases of alleged violations of human rights that 
occur in any Member State of the Community.80 The Supplementary Protocol compels 
member states to ensure the application of international law instruments and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in their jurisdictions. Therefore, there is no doubt with 
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respect to the jurisdiction of the Court of justice now to adjudicate any case of alleged 
violation of the Human Rights that occurs in the states that have affiliated to the treaties.81 
 
Article 9 (4) of the 2005 ECOWAS Treaty confers an explicit human rights mandate on the 
ECCJ.82 This mandate was codified by a 2005 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol, which 
states that the ECCJ has jurisdiction to hear human rights cases and expands the admissibility 
rules to include disputes between individuals and their own member states.83 Article 9 (4) 
states that “The Court has jurisdiction to determine cases of violation of human rights that 
occur in any Member State”.84 The ECCJ has since received and adjudicated several human 
rights cases and is the only REC tribunal that has a clear and unambiguous express mandate 
to adjudicate human rights matters.85 Even, however, where there is an express mandate, 
there are still a number of questions that arise concerning the exact extent of this mandate – I 
will explore a number of cases addressing these questions that have arisen in the ECCJ.  
 
An example of a case where the ECCJ human rights mandate was challenged after the 2005 
Supplementary Protocol is the case of Tandja v Djibo and Another.86 Mr Tandja was 
forcibly removed as a president in 2010.  It was alleged that the former Niger President Mr 
Mamadou Tandja was arrested on politically-related charges and was denied a chance to 
defend himself before a court of law. Mr Tandja alleged that his right to be heard before the 
court of law had been violated. Furthermore, Mr Tandja alleged that he was denied an 
opportunity to go and gain access to medical treatment in other countries for his medical 
conditions.  Consequently, Mr Tandja alleged, amongst others, violation of articles 4 and 5 of 
the 1993 revised ECOWAS Treaty; articles 1 ,3, 5, 6 and 18 of the African Charter; articles 2, 
3, 8 and 26 of ICCPR, articles 5, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 25 of the Universal Declaration; and a 
domestic statute.87 Article 4 (g) of the Treaty provides for the recognition, promotion and 
                                                          
81 http://documentation.ecowas.int/legal-documents/protocols/ 
82
 Solomon T Ebobrah, Human rights developments in African sub-regional economic communities during 
2011, (2012), Vol 1, Page 223-253 
83 Solomon T Ebobrah, A rights-protection goldmine or a waiting volcanic eruption? Competence of, and access 
to, the human rights jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, (2007), Vol 2, Page 307-329 
84 Article 9 (4) of the 2005 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol 
http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/protocols/Supplementary%20Protocol%20Ame
nding%20the%20Preamble.pdf 
85 Lucyline Nkatha Murungi, Revisiting the role of sub-regional courts in the protection of human rights in 
Africa, (2009), Page 12  
86 Mamadou Tandja v General Salou Djibou & Another ECW/CCJ/APP/05/10 
87 Articles 1, 2 ,3, 5, 6 of the ECOWAS Treaty; article 18 of the African Charter; articles 2, 3, 8 and 26 of 
ICCPR; articles 5, 7, 8, 9, 13 and article 25 of the Universal Declaration 
22 
 
protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; whereas article 2 provides that each Member State 
shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, take all necessary measures to ensure 
the enactment and dissemination of such legislative and statutory texts as may be necessary 
for the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty. Mr Tandja also claims that he was 
subjected to torture during his detention period. Mr Tandja sought relief from ECCJ to 
declare that his human rights had been violated and to order the defendants to send him for 
treatment abroad at the expense of the state.88 
 
The government of Niger challenged the ECCJ’s jurisdiction and stated that the matter was of 
a political nature and, therefore, cannot be adjudicated by the ECCJ. In response to the 
argument made that political detention did not fall within the jurisdiction of the ECCJ 
conferred by article 9(4) of the 2005 Supplementary Protocol, the Court pointed out that no 
distinction between political and other violations could be found in its Protocol.89 The Court 
importantly stressed that merely alleging the existence of a human rights violation triggered 
its jurisdiction.90 The ECCJ rejected the preliminary objection made about its mandate and 
has been consistent in adjudicating human rights using the express mandate.91 
 
Another example where the ECCJ utilised its human rights mandate is in the case of Sikuru 
Alade v. Federal Republic Nigeria.92 Mr Alade was arrested on 9 March 2003 and detained 
at Ketu Police station. In May 2003, he appeared before Yaba Magistrate Court without being 
charged and he was remanded in custody on allegations of armed robbery. Mr Alade was kept 
at Kirikiri Maximum Security Prison in Apapa, Lagos, for more than nine years without 
being charged with any crime under any law before a court of law.93 On September 18, 2012, 
following a judgment of the magistrate’s court, he was released following a review by the 
Chief Judge of Lagos. 
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The use of the holding charge to detain a suspect indefinitely violates Alade’s rights under 
the African Charter to liberty and freedom from arbitrary detention (article 6), (article 32) of 
the Revised Treaty of Economic Community of West African States and the Protocol on free 
movement of persons and Goods, and to equality before the law (article 3).94 Article 3 (1) 
states “that every individual shall be equal before the law” whereas article 6 states that “every 
individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person.95 No one may be 
deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In 
particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained”.96 International human rights law 
requires that a suspect is promptly brought before a judicial officer who has the power to 
order release.97 The ECOWAS Court found that Alade’s prolonged detention was unlawful, 
and violated the 2005 ECOWAS Protocol.98 The Court held that the purpose of the detention 
was relevant to whether or not the detention was unlawful, finding that “it is the position in 
law that the said process was not meant to keep the plaintiff perpetually in custody but to be 
tried by an appropriate court thereby making the process legal and competent”.99 The Court 
further held that “No court would allow such prolonged detention to continue without abating 
same therefore for that reason, the said detention is hereby adjudged illegal and this Court 
holds that the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of proof that his human right was 
violated”.100 The court ordered the respondent to pay damages and compensation to the 
applicant in this matter. 101 
The ECCJ has been consistent in holding and maintaining its view of having an explicit 
human rights mandate compared to its counterparties i.e. the SADC Tribunal and the ECCJ.  
The same transpired in the case of Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights and 
Accountability Project (SERAP) v The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and 
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Eight Others.102 The matter was brought by SERAP against the government of Nigeria, the 
Nigerian state-owned oil corporation and five multinational oil companies with operations in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria for alleged abuse arising from decades of poor corporate 
practices in the region.103 The applicant claimed violations of the rights to food, work, health, 
water, life, human dignity, a clean and healthy environment and to economic and social 
development.104 In their preliminary objections, the defendants argued that the ECCJ lacked 
jurisdiction over the non-state-actor defendants. The defendant disputed the ECCJ 
jurisdiction over the matter.105 
Jurisdiction against the Federal Republic of Nigeria was obvious as Nigeria is one of the 
countries that ratified the ECOWAS Treaty as well as other community instruments like the 
Protocols on Democracy and Good Governance and on the Competence of the Community 
Court of Justice. Therefore, there was no doubt with respect to the ECCJ jurisdiction over 
alleged violations of the Human Rights that occur in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.106 The 
only question that was problematic was whether the ECCJ has the mandate to adjudicate the 
cases involving multinational companies that were allegedly found unlawfully causing oil 
pollution. Unfortunately, the court declared that the ECCJ currently does not possess 
jurisdiction against, multinational corporations, for violations or complicity in violations of 
human rights happening in ECOWAS Community. 107 This shows the extent of the ECCJ 
human rights mandate. The mandate is limited to the ECOWAS members’ states and not 
companies. 
  It is evident that the ECCJ has so far been active in dealing with human rights matters due to 
its advantage of having a clear and unambiguous mandate. It has also addressed a wide range 
of matters relating to human rights. Unfortunately, it has been relatively conservative in 
extending its mandate to cover multi-national corporations. Nevertheless in relation to the 
state, the Court appears to be getting bolder and more comfortable with its role as a human 
rights court.108 
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1.4 The implied mandate in international human rights courts 
Since this study is dealing with the difference between the express and implied human rights 
mandates and their relative effectiveness, it is worth investigating how the implied mandate 
functions in relation to other international human rights courts.  
 
1.4.1 International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
The ICJ’s position on an implied mandate has been dealt with in different cases mentioned 
below. The ICJ has indeed expressed its view that it is not limited by express jurisdiction but 
also can accommodate implied jurisdiction to achieve the purpose for which it was created. 
The ICJ has not shied away from utilising an implied mandate where it does not possess an 
express mandate.  
 
A good example where the ICJ was faced with the decision to utilise an implied mandate is 
the case of Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion.109 In this case, a number of people had died while they were in the service of the 
United Nations.110 Following their deaths, the General Assembly requested an advisory 
opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on whether the United Nations had the 
capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible government for the people 
who had died whilst in the service of the United Nations. This was made with a view to 
obtaining reparations due in respect of the damage caused to the victims, or the persons 
entitled to such reparation through the victim.111 The court first indicates that the Charter of 
the United Nations (UN Charter) "does not expressly confer upon the Organisation the 
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capacity to include, in its claim for reparation, damage caused to the victim or to persons 
entitled through him".112 
 
The crucial question that the ICJ faced in this matter was “whether or not the provisions of 
the Charter concerning the functions of the Organisation, and the part played by its agents in 
the performance of those functions, imply for the Organisation power to afford its agents the 
limited protection that would consist in the bringing of a claim on their behalf for reparation 
for damage suffered in such circumstances”.113 In response to the abovementioned question, 
the Court stated that, under international law, an organisation must be construed as being 
given implied powers which are necessary for discharging its duties even if such powers are 
not expressly provided for in the constituent document.114 It can be argued, as a result, that 
the ICJ does not shy away from exercising an implied mandate where necessary. The Court 
has also since applied the doctrine of implied powers in other cases as well.115 It can be 
argued that the mandate of the court is linked with the objective for which the court is 
created. The ICJ has taken the position not to limit itself to only an express mandate but to 
consider matters that enables it to fulfil the purpose of its creation. 
 
Another matter where the ICJ declared its position on the implied mandate was in the case of 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations. In the 1960s, the United Nations undertook to take 
part in the peace-keeping operations taking place in Congo and the UN Emergency Force in 
the Middle East. The members of the United Nations raised an objection to the idea of 
participating in the peace-keeping operations, the reason being they were not bound by the 
peace-keeping operations happening in Congo as the operation had not been undertaken in 
line with the provisions of the UN Charter.116 To this effect, they argued that members of the 
United Nations should not be bound by such obligations. This resulted in the General 
Assembly submitting a request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ on whether certain 
expenditure which had been authorised by the General Assembly to cover the costs of the 
United Nations operation in the Congo and Middle East constituted expenses of the 
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organisation within the meaning of article 17 (2) of the UN Charter.117 In response to the 
question raised in this matter, the ICJ stated that when the Organisation takes actions which 
warrant the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the objectives of the 
United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.118 
 
As in the Reparations case, the court again demonstrated its ability to utilise its interpretative 
powers by not restricting itself to what was contained in a specific clause of the constituent 
document, but by finding that it was necessary to imply that the Organisation had the 
additional powers necessary in order for it to be able to achieve its object and purposes as 
provided for in the founding document.119 The Court's approach is acceptable, and it is 
argued that it is in line with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Vienna Convention). These require that a treaty be interpreted with reference inter alia to its 
objectives and purposes.120 The ICJ believes that by applying the implied power it is 
achieving the purpose and objectives for which it – or other organisations - has been created 
for.  
 
1.4.2 ICTY 
The ICTY confirmed its position regarding the implied mandate in the case of Prosecutor v 
Duško Tadić. 121 The UN Security Council created the ICTY to prosecute parties who are 
involved in violations of international humanitarian law as happened in the 1990s in 
Yugoslavia.122 In creating the ICTY, the Security Council acted in terms of article 39 of the 
UN Charter, which had given it powers to determine inter alia the existence of a threat to 
peace or a breach of the peace and to decide what measures to take in order to restore peace 
in accordance with articles 41 or 42 of the UN Charter.123 The Security Council, in this 
instance, opted to create the ICTY under article 41 of the UN Charter to avoid use of force as 
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a measure to restore peace. Article 41 does not involve the use of force but encourages 
measures not involving armed force to be used. 124 
Article 41 of the UN Charter states that “ the Security Council may decide what measure not 
involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it 
may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, postal, telegraphic, radio 
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”.125 Article 42 
of the UN Charter states that “Should the security Council consider that measures provided 
for in article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, other operations by air, sea or 
land forces of Members of the United Nation”.126 
The accused filed a preliminary motion challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the 
basis that it lacked the power and the competency to try him.127 The accused argued that the 
actions of the Security Council in creating the ICTY and its statute were beyond the Security 
Council’s powers under article 41 of the UN Charter.128 Further, the accused inter alia argued 
that the establishment of the ICTY had not been envisaged under article 41 of the UN Charter 
because the examples contained therein did not include judicial measures, but only economic 
and political sanctions.129 The ICTY did not accept this argument and held that Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter confers "very wide powers" upon the Security Council and that there was 
no good reason advanced as to why article 41 should be read as excluding the establishment 
of the ICTY to punish those responsible for atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.130 The court 
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therefore dismissed the accused's preliminary motion that challenged the jurisdiction of the 
ICTY. The approach adopted by the court in this matter is commendable as it adopted a 
flexible approach in interpreting article 41 of the UN Charter to also include powers of the 
Security Council to create a tribunal. Indeed, the measures listed under article 41 of the UN 
Charter do not constitute a closed list, as the words "may include" imply that other measures 
that are not listed in the provision may also be explored.131 It is submitted that had the ICTY 
adopted a rigid approach in interpreting the provisions of the UN Charter, this would have 
denied the Security Council an opportunity to deal with something that was well within its 
powers – namely, to restore peace.132 The use of the implied mandate was therefore important 
in achieving the very purposes for which it was established.  
 
1.4.3 European Court of Justice  
The European Court of Justice confirmed its position on the implied mandate, in the 
joined cases of P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v 
Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.133 
This case dealt with the freezing of assets of Mr Kadi, a Saudi resident with assets 
in Sweden, and Al Barakaat, a charity for Somali refugees, who claimed that this action 
was unlawful.134 Their assets were taken from them without them being given an 
opportunity to prove their innocence from any wrongdoing in a court of law.  The above 
mentioned asset freezing was as a result of The UN Security Council adopting 
resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to freeze assets of people and groups 
associated with the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden. The EU adopted Regulations to give 
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effect to this resolution. Sweden had given effect to the Regulation.135 The claimants 
were named in the Resolution and Regulation.136 In 2001 Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat 
made an application in the Court of First Instance and requested that Council Regulation 
(EC) No 467/2001 of March 6, 2001 be annulled. Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat argued that 
Council of the EU lacked competence.  
In 2005, The Court of the First Instance ruled that it has no jurisdiction to review the 
validity of the contested regulations and therefore rejected the applicant’s application. 
The applicants were not satisfied with the outcomes of the case and appealed the Court 
of First Instance decision to the ECJ. The applicants’ claimed the Regulation should be 
annulled under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) article 263 
and that it was a breach of human rights.137 Article 263 of the TFEU “states that the 
Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts of the 
Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than 
recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of the 
European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.138 It shall also 
review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to 
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties”.139 
The ECJ ruled that it has jurisdiction to review measures adopted by the European 
Community (EC) giving effect to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
adopted against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorist networks.140 The ECJ found that the 
regulation of the Council of the EU infringed the appellants’ fundamental individual rights 
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under EC law, including the right to be heard before a court of law, the right of effective 
judicial review, and the right to property. 141 The ECJ further held that Council of the EU was 
also competent to adopt the regulations as well. The Court also recognised that the European 
Union has competence to enter into international agreements even where there is no express 
authorisation from its constituent document.142 
1.5 Concluding remarks 
From the analysis done in this chapter, it transpires that the treaties establishing the EACJ and 
the SADC Tribunal are not clear on whether the tribunals have the mandate to adjudicate 
human rights matters or not. The SADC Treaty does refer to human rights as a principle in its 
preamble; however, it is debatable as to whether the principles are binding or not. The SADC 
Tribunal resorted to using the implied mandate to decide on human rights in the Campbell 
case, however, received a significant backlash. With regards to the EACJ, thus far, the East 
Africa Council has not officially determined the court’s human rights jurisdiction; however, 
the EAC Bill has been created but is not yet in operation. The EACJ has no clear human 
rights mandate but has resorted to using the implied mandate in human rights matters. It has 
been noted in this chapter that the standard that is used to measure the applicability of the 
implied mandate is, whether the assumption of jurisdiction in relation to human rights matters 
fulfils the objective for which the tribunal was created. Having explored all the REC 
Tribunals, the ECCJ is the only REC Court that has an express human rights mandate. The 
ECCJ also deals with cases emanating from other international human rights instruments, 
amongst others, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples rights, Universal 
declaration, ICCPR etc. The ECCJ is better compared to its counterparts in terms of having a 
clear mandate and the rate of human rights cases it has dealt with so far. The reason for its 
better rate and success is, in my view, because of its having a clear express mandate.  
 
Other international courts such as the ICTY, the European Court of Justice and the ICJ were 
examined to explore their position on the implied mandate. The implied mandate is well 
understood and utilised in the ICTY, the European Court of Justice and the ICJ. 
Consequently, it is entirely legitimate for REC Tribunals to draw on the well-established 
notion of an implied mandate. The only challenge that the REC Tribunals have in carrying 
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out the implied mandate in human rights cases is that they were created for economic 
integration issues and not to deal with human rights matters. This has led to challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the courts in this regard. The backlash against their exercise of the implied 
mandate will be examined in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Backlashes against REC tribunals 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the link between the nature of the 
mandate of REC tribunals and the effectiveness of their exercise of such a mandate. The link 
between the two cannot only be measured by the success of the REC tribunals but also by the 
backlashes experienced by the tribunals. It will be argued in this chapter that, in relation to 
the RECs, the more explicit the mandate, the greater the capacity to be effective in relation to 
human rights questions. The comparison and analysis will be made to demonstrate that the 
SADC Tribunal has received the worst backlash, with the EACJ coming second in this 
regard. The ECCJ has an express mandate and has therefore been subject to less backlashes. 
Examples of cases where the tribunals experienced the backlashes from member states will 
be provided in support of the view that there is a greater link between the nature of the 
mandate of the court and its effectiveness in adjudicating and enforcing human rights matters.  
 
2.2 Non-compliance against the REC decisions and backlash by Member States 
 
2.2.1 The backlash against the SADC Tribunal by Zimbabwe  
The Southern African Development Community Tribunal's (SADC Tribunal) decision in the 
matter of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe 2008 SADCT 2 (28 November 
2008) demonstrated its ability to utilise the principles contained in the Treaty of the Southern 
African Development Community when it ruled that it had the power and competency to 
adjudicate over a human rights case. The aforesaid decision was hailed by many scholars as a 
progressive judgment in the SADC region that would promote the rule of law and ensure that 
member states respected their treaty obligations in their own territories. Unfortunately, the 
same judgment resulted in the suspension of the SADC Tribunal in 2010 because it had 
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purportedly according to State parties acted beyond its mandate when it adjudicated over a 
case concerning a human rights dispute.  
 
Following the decision taken by the SADC Tribunal in the case of Campbell, the 
Zimbabwean government executed a plan that resulted in a severe backlash against the 
Tribunal. This was evidenced by Former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s speeches 
on the Tribunal’s decisions, his influence at Summit meetings and Former Zimbabwean 
Justice Minister’s interventions to disregard the Tribunal’s decisions. The challenges against 
the legitimacy of its decision-making and the extent of the powers conferred upon the SADC 
Tribunal in Campbell’s case eventually resulted in its demise.143 It was consequently 
suspended in August 2010 by the SADC Heads of States and Government.144  
 
The resolution taken by the SADC Heads of State was that the Tribunal should neither 
receive nor adjudicate any human rights cases indefinitely. During the SADC summit in 
August 2014, a Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community 
was adopted and signed (the 2014 Protocol).145 The SADC Summit has now limited the 
SADC Tribunal to hear inter-State disputes, not cases brought before it by private litigants. 
Unfortunately, it also does not provide any transitional measures to address issues such as the 
manner to deal with pending cases and the enforcement of judgments.146 The SADC tribunal 
remains suspended and the 2014 Protocol, was adopted without any human rights 
jurisdiction.147  
 
Many believe that the disbanding of the SADC Tribunal in 2012 was reflective of a SADC 
hierarchy of values that reflects a lack of formal commitment to human rights.148 It is obvious 
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from the events that led to the SADC tribunal that a regional legal order is subordinate to the 
political imperatives of regime solidarity and respect for national sovereignty.149 States have 
traditionally been very willing to relinquish sovereignty with regard to direct trade and 
economic matters, yet human rights have remained a sensitive and neglected issue.150 There 
is a greater lack of appreciation in the human rights context for the idea that the decisions of 
regional courts could take priority over national courts.151As was mentioned, as a direct result 
of the Zimbabwean opposition to the Campbell decision, the heads of state and government 
of SADC decided to suspend the tribunal until August 2012. Then, in August 2012, the doors 
of the tribunal closed to individuals. The court is currently at a standstill in terms of 
adjudicating matters brought by individuals. 
 
Another important SADC backlash case which dispute emanated from Campbell’s case was 
the case of Fick and Four Others v Zimbabwe.152 The case was concluded in 2008. The 
matter followed just after Zimbabwe refused to comply with the SADC Tribunal’s decision 
and utterance of statements made by the officials against the judgement. The matter brought 
before the SADC Tribunal aimed at requesting the Tribunal to report the refusal of the 
implementation of its decision to the SADC Summit for enforcement action. Zimbabwe 
refused to take part in the court’s proceedings in this matter and the court only heard the 
applicant’s evidence.  Naturally, the Tribunal concluded that the ‘existence of further acts of 
non-compliance with the decision of the Tribunal had been established’.153 The Tribunal 
decided to once again report non-compliance to the Summit.154  
 
Considering that it was not the first time that Zimbabwe was reported to the Summit for not 
complying with the same SADC Tribunal decision, it indicates that there is weak 
enforcement and implementation mechanism in the SADC REC. An enforcement solution 
should be sought as it may also be relevant in the future since there is a plan to establish 
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African Human Rights Court aimed at dealing with human rights matters. The court may face 
the same enforcement challenges that the SADC Tribunal faced and it is important that a plan 
be developed beforehand to address these challenges.  
 
The SADC Tribunal backlash escalated to another level in the case of Government of the 
Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick & others.155 This is an appeal case dealt with by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (‘SCA’) of South Africa. The appeal emanate from the case of Fick and 
Four Others vs Zimbabwe case which was dealt with by the Tribunal. In the Tribunal case of 
Fick, the Tribunal held that Zimbabwe should pay the legal costs to the respondents. 
Zimbabwe failed to comply with the Tribunal order which then led the respondents to file an 
application to the North Gauteng High Court with an effort to have the costs order 
acknowledged in South Africa. Judge Rabie recognised the Tribunal’s costs order.156 
Furthermore, a writ of execution was granted authorising the Sheriff to attach and sell the 
immovable property of Zimbabwe situated in Cape Town to honor the Tribunal’s costs 
order.157Rabie J granted the order in February 2010 that the SADC Tribunal order delivered 
on November 2008 and June 2009 are declared to be registered i.e. recognised and 
enforceable in terms of article 32 of the Protocol of the SADC Tribunal by the High Court of 
South Africa, and the quantum of the costs pursuant to the latter ruling is to be declared to be 
as determined by the Registrar of the SADC Tribunal in the allocator attached, namely 
US$ 5 816.47 and ZAR 112 780.13.’158 
 
Zimbabwe made an Application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (‘SCA’) 
against the above mentioned decision disputing the enforcement of a costs order. The SCA 
dismissed the appeal on the basis that there was no valid reason that hinders the Court not to 
adopt the decisions taken by the Tribunal. The reason for the decision was that Zimbabwe 
adopted the SADC Treaty that allows the decision of the Tribunal to be recognised in other 
jurisdictions. The SCA relied on article 32 (3) which provides that decisions of the Tribunal 
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shall be binding upon the parties to the dispute in respect of that particular case and 
enforceable within the territories of the Member States concerned.159  
Zimbabwe made another appeal to the Constitutional Court seeking an order to declare the 
cost enforcement order made by the High Court of South Africa unconstitutional.160 The 
crucial legal question argued on the matter was whether South African courts have 
jurisdiction to register and thus facilitate the enforcement of a costs order made by the 
Tribunal against a state.161 The Court held that the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
were correct in enforcing the decision of the Tribunal. The appeal was dismissed.162 The 
further Court held that the South African common law on the enforcement of foreign civil 
judgments only provided for the execution of judgments of domestic courts of a foreign 
state.163 Thus, there was a need to develop the common law to pave the way for the 
enforcement of judgments or orders made in international tribunals.164 The Court held that the 
development of the common law was driven by the need to ensure that lawful judgments are 
not evaded with impunity by States.165 The Court quoted article 32 (3) of the Tribunal 
Protocol that binds the SADC Member States, including South Africa, to take all execution-
facilitating measures, including the development of the common law, necessary to “ensure 
execution of decisions of the Tribunal”.166 Furthermore, the Court held that section 34 (the 
right of access to courts) of the Constitution, obliged the Court to develop the common law to 
promote access to courts.167  
2.2.2 The backlash against the EACJ from Kenya  
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The EACJ experience a serious backlash in the case of Anyang Nyong’o v Attorney General 
of Kenya.168 In this case, it was alleged that the Kenyan government tried to retreat from the 
existing power sharing agreement that exists between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The 
default was defined as an effort to try to take control of the important spheres of the 
government by the Kenyan government for its selfish ambitions and as a result the matter was 
brought before the attention of the EACJ. The EACJ temporarily ordered the EAC REC not 
to recognise Kenya’s East African Legislative Authority (EALA). The decision was taken 
pending finalisation of the merits of the case before the EACJ at the time. In response to the 
decision taken against Kenyan government, the Kenyan government made some utterances 
about retaliation and threatened two EACJ judges who come from Kenya that they should not 
continue to serve the EACJ; otherwise, they will no longer be allowed to serve at the Kenya 
local courts when their time expires as judges of the EACJ.  
After trying to avoid implementing the EACJ Judgement, the government of Kenya finally 
decided to implement the EACJ decision. The government of Kenya revised the rules 
regulating the procedure to nominate its EALA membership. Prior to the case of Anyang’ 
Nyong’o’, the EACJ had one chamber of six judges, but after the decision taken in this case 
the Court was then split into two divisions namely : the Appellate division and the Court of 
first instance. The above changes were incorporated on the EAC Treaty in 2006 and 2007.  
 
Organisations such as Civil Society and East African Law Society (EALS) were not entirely 
satisfied with the way the process effecting the amendments on the EAC Treaty was handled 
and felt somehow excluded from the amendment process. EALS challenged the adoption of 
the amended EAC Treaty in the case of East African Law Society and Others v Attorney 
General of Kenya and Others. The applicants alleges that the process followed in the 
adoption of the 2006 protocol was contrary to article 150 of the EAC Treaty. In this case, the 
Court held that amendments process infringed on the Treaty as Civil Society and the private 
sector had not been allowed to participate in drafting the amendments.169 Despite the Court 
declaring that the process of amendment violates article 150 of the EAC Treaty, the court did 
not invalidate the amendments as the infringement was not a conscious one and was not 
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likely to recur.170 The EACJ further held that the amendments excluding its interpretation 
from jurisdiction conferred upon organs of partner States have the effect of compromising or 
contradicting the principle of the supremacy of the EACJ in the interpretation and application 
of the EAC Treaty.171 With regards to the criteria for the removal of judges, the court held 
that the introduction of automatic removal and suspension on grounds raised or established in 
the home State, and applicable to only those in Judicial or public office, makes possibilities 
of applying non-uniform standards to judges of the same court and can endanger the integrity 
of the Court as a regional Court.172  
 
Another major reason for the EACJ decisions backlash is that the EACJ does not necessarily 
have effective enforcement mechanism that can make the States bear consequences in the 
case of non-compliance. The lack of effective enforcement mechanism leaves the States with 
the decision to comply or not with the Court’s decisions. 
 
2.2.3 Non-compliance and backlash against the ECCJ’s judgments 
The rate of human rights cases under the ECCJ is better but not good enough. Besides having 
a better rate of cases there are still some countries that have shown resistance to the decisions 
taken by the ECCJ. The backlash against the ECCJ stemmed from suits against the Gambia 
that fell squarely within the court’s human rights authority in 2009. The backlashes against 
the ECCJ decisions happened despite having a 2005 Supplementary Protocol that gives the 
ECOWAS Court clear express jurisdiction over alleged violations of human rights.173 
An example of a case where the ECCJ experienced backlash from the state is the case of 
Chief Ebrimah Manneh v The Republic of The Gambia.174 In this case, the plaintiff was a 
journalist at the Daily Observer Newspaper based in Uganda.  The Plaintiff was arrested by 
two officials from the National Intelligence Agency of The Gambia at the Daily Observer’s 
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premises in Banjul on 11 July 2006. The arrest was effected without the necessary warrant of 
arrest.175 The reasons for his arrest were not disclosed by the government of Gambia.176 After 
his arrest, the plaintiff was detained at different premises including amongst others at the 
National Intelligence Agency Headquarters, State Central Prison, Kartong, Police Station, 
Sibanor Police Station, Kuntaur Police Station and Fatoto Police Station without being 
formally charged of committing any criminal offence.177 The plaintiff had at some point been 
denied access to adequate medical care and the letter from his legal representative asking for 
his release was ignored.178 
 
The Court found that the applicant was arrested and had since been detained without being 
charged. The Court held that these acts clearly violated the provisions of articles 2, 6 and 7(1) 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Furthermore, the court ordered that the 
applicant be paid damages.179  
 
Gambia refused to accept both the procedure and the ECCJ decision by not attending the 
court session and by further refusing to implement the decision taken in this case. To this 
point, there still have been no consequences that Gambian government as a results of its non-
compliance with the ECCJ judgement. A backlash such as this defeats the purpose of the 
existence of the court.  
 
The backlash of the Gambian government is a clear indication of the weak post-decision 
mechanisms that oversee the full implementation of the ECCJ’s decision. The backlash 
against the ECCJ is also an indication of the lack of desire to appreciate the good work that 
the Court is doing in protecting human rights. Even where there is an express human rights 
mandate, then, it is possible for a court to struggle to have its decisions rendered effective.  
                                                          
175 Chief Ebrimah Manneh v The Republic of The Gambia ECW/CCJ/APP/04/07 Judgment on 5 June 2008 
176 The Gambia: Manneh v The Gambia (2008) AHRLR 171 (ECOWAS 2008) 
177 The Gambia: Manneh v The Gambia (2008) AHRLR 171 (ECOWAS 2008) 
178 The Gambia: Manneh v The Gambia (2008) AHRLR 171 (ECOWAS 2008) 
179 The Gambia: Manneh v The Gambia (2008) AHRLR 171 (ECOWAS 2008) 
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Another case where the court experienced a backlash was the case of Mr Chude v Mba.180 In 
this case it was alleged that Mr Chude acquired a portion of land to develop in Accra. He 
commenced construction to build two apartment blocks which were put on hold by the 
Ghanaian authority without a valid reason. Mr Chude then sued the authority in the ECCJ for 
violation of human rights and was awarded relief which is inclusive of compensation. The 
backlash started when the High Court of Accra delivered a decision on 02 February 2016 
contrary to the decision that the ECCJ took. The High court of Accra held that the decision of 
the ECCJ could not be enforced by its domestic courts because Ghana had not yet 
domesticated the 2005 Supplementary Protocol.181 It was only upon Mr Chude Mba’s 
application to the ECCJ for a writ of judgement execution in December 2016, claiming the 
award conferred by the ECCJ’s judgment, and complaining about the Ghanaian government’s 
non-compliance with the decision that Ghana agreed to settle the payment.182 This shows that 
one of the things that is causing the backlashes is the fact that some countries have not 
ratified the ECOWAS’s Supplementary Protocol of 2005. This allows a loophole to exist 
which can stand against national enforcement.  
 
Another case where the ECCJ experienced a backlash was the case of Moukhtar Ibrahim 
Aminu vs Government of Jigawa State of Nigeria and Others.183 It was alleged that 
Moukhtar Ibrahim Aminu criticised politicians on social media which resulted in his arrest.184 
The applicant was arrested in the northern state of Jigawa for public nuisance.185 The 
applicant was detained in prison several days before he made an official appearance before 
the local court. He appeared in a local court and was remanded in custody until the trial date. 
Mr Aminu took the matter to the ECCJ alleging that his detention was unlawful. The first and 
the second defendant contended in their preliminary objection that the ECCJ did not have the 
jurisdiction to entertain the action on grounds amongst others that the protocol of the ECCJ 
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which gave it the power to hear and determine issues of violation of human rights by 
individuals had not been domesticated in Nigeria as provided for in section 12 of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.186 The ECCJ rejected the defendant’s 
contention about the ECCJ jurisdiction in the matter and concluded that Nigeria is bound by 
the ECOWAS Treaty provision.187  
Another backlash experienced by the ECCJ was in the case of Saidykhan v The Gambia.188 
In this case, it was alleged that in March 2006, Musa Saidykhan was arrested and detained by 
the police. It was further alleged that Musa was tortured during his detention which left him 
injured.189 The Applicant brought the case before the ECCJ alleging that his rights has been 
violated. He alleged that articles 5, 6 and 7 of the ACHPR had been violated. Article 5 of the 
ACHPR states that every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent 
in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status.190 All forms of exploitation and 
degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.191 Article 6 of the ACHPR states every 
individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be 
deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In 
particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.192 Article 7 (1) states that every 
individual shall have the right to have his cause heard.193 The government of Gambia utilised 
the normal Court’s procedure to challenge the mandate of the court on human rights matters 
and failed. They then resorted to making a request to the ECOWAS Commission to revise the 
supplementary protocol. They argued that the Court’s mandate should only be limited to 
cases of violation of human rights emanating from the member states that have ratified the 
protocol; secondly, that the parties bringing human rights matters before the ECCJ exhaust all 
local remedies before approaching ECCJ; and, thirdly, that the court should at least create the 
process which allows the parties to appeal the Court’s decision.  
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In my view, the proposed amendments made by the government of Gambia were an excuse 
for its failure to protect its citizens’ human rights. It has not even ratified the United Nations 
Charter and that shows that it does not have the desire to recognise human rights. The NGOs 
in West Africa exerted significant efforts to fight the proposed amendments as they do not 
contribute and add value to the development of human rights within the REC. The ECOWAS 
Commission rejected the proposed amendments and the ECOWAS Council of Justice 
concurred with the Commission’s decision to reject the proposal. 
In a bid to encourage West African Member States to enforce its decisions, the ECCJ has 
issued an appeal to its Member States not to ignore its judgments.194 The failure of West 
African Member States to do so is cited as a key challenge of the Court and the President of 
the ECCJ has linked judicial efficiency to the enforcement of the court’s judgments.195 An 
express mandate is therefore not a guarantee of effectiveness: nevertheless, in comparison to 
other courts, the ECCJ has performed relatively well. 
 
Concluding remarks 
From the discussion above, it is clear that each REC tribunal has at some points faced a 
backlash from its Member States, especially those against whom the Courts have issued 
damning human rights violation judgments. While some strategies to curtail the powers were 
mild (such as the Gambian government’s attempts), and some a bit more cunning and multi-
pronged (the Kenyan and Zimbabwean governments’ strategies), the Zimbabwean strategy 
was the most ruthless, which had an aim from the outset to destroy the sub-regional court’s 
budding human rights focus. 
 
In this Chapter, we can learn that the ECCJ remains a relatively successful court in terms of 
the judgements decided and enforced compared to its counterparts, the SADC Tribunal and 
the EACJ. Even so, it is clear that an express mandate provides no insulation against a refusal 
of states to accept and enforce judgments. Nevertheless, there also remains a wide-ranging 
political commitment to the jurisdiction of the ECCJ by most sub-regional member states. 
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This can be contrasted with the position of the SADC Tribunal where there was a lack of 
political will to support its assumption of an implied mandate in this regard which ultimately 
resulted in its suspension. Whilst the EACJ has also experienced a backlash, there was less 
political collusion amongst heads of state which avoided a revocation of its implied mandate. 
Thus, where there has not been an express agreement on human rights jurisdiction, it is clear 
that the political will amongst members states to abide by the judgments of a court will be, 
ultimately, the decisive factor.  
 
Chapter 3 – Summary of the findings 
3.1 Summary of the findings of the REC tribunal effectiveness and recommendations 
The SADC Tribunal experienced the greatest failure of them all as it was suspended in 2010 
presumably for adjudicating a human rights matters without a clear mandate i.e. the case of 
Campbell.  Even though the reasons for its suspension were not well and clearly articulated, it 
was evident at the time of declaration of its suspension that the decision to suspend it was a 
negative response and punishment for trying to play an activist role in the Campbell case. 
Moreover, it also cannot be ignored that sub-regional political factors played a role in the 
SADC Tribunal’s suspension. Phoko asserts that the suspension of the SADC Tribunal was a 
result of the Tribunal having ruled against one of their own.196 This backlash has worsened 
the lack of a formal enforcement structure in the SADC region. 
 
The backlash that the SADC Tribunal experienced is seen as a setback to the protection of 
human rights within the sub-region as the tribunal cannot be currently used as one of the 
possible avenues that the individuals have to vindicate their human rights. The suspension of 
the SADC Tribunal is indefinite and has a bad effect on the SADC sub-region. The 
suspension is an indication that there is no formal commitment by the SADC Community to 
adjudicate human rights matters.  
The second worst amongst the REC tribunals in terms of having an ambiguous human rights 
mandate and less enforcement success of the decisions in relation to human rights is the 
EACJ. The EACJ assumed and pronounced that it had a human rights mandate in terms of 
article 27 of the EACJ treaty. The assumption was incorrect as the article referred to above 
requires the establishment of a new treaty conferring a human rights mandate. The EACJ 
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remains without a formal written commitment to adjudicate human rights matters as there is 
no Treaty that confers a human rights mandate on the EACJ. The EAC council has recently 
shown an interest in protecting human rights within the EAC region by creating the EAC Bill 
which will be enacted into law in future.  The Bill was developed as a result of the 
commitment previously made in writing on article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty.197 The article 
provides that the court’s jurisdiction to hear human rights cases, will be determined at a later 
date by the Council, and further that member states will need to enact a Protocol to effect the 
extended jurisdiction. Galinate is of the view that the development is to be welcomed because 
it is likely to advance the cause of the promotion and protection of human rights.198 It looks 
likely therefore that the political will is developing in East Africa to adopt an express 
mandate for the EACJ.  
 
Unlike the SADC Tribunal and the EACJ, the ECCJ has an explicit mandate to adjudicate 
human rights matters and is a good example of a better REC Court in terms of adjudicating 
human rights related decisions. As of April 2018, the ECCJ announced that since 2005 when 
the Supplementary Protocol was adopted, only 22 out of the 64 decisions of the court (64 
being the number of those decisions that can be enforced) have been enforced by West 
African Member States.199 Furthermore, 4 West African countries have established their focal 
points for the enforcement of the ECCJ’s judgments and 13 Member States are reported to 
have enforced the Court’s decisions.200 Even though it is more successful compared to other 
REC, it is not successful enough and more attention needs to be given to ensuring the 
enforcement of such judgments. 
 
3.2 Recommendations 
The study recommends the following:  
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● The SADC council should consider having a clear and concise human rights mandate 
as there is a clear link between human rights and economic integration. Even though 
the initial mandate of the Tribunal was to deal with economic integration, the human 
rights mandate can be formalised through developing a protocol that can explicitly 
confer such a mandate on the Tribunal.  
SADC region countries should be encouraged to formalise a process of dealing with 
human rights protection despite political differences. One of the factors that transpired 
to have led to the suspension of the SADC tribunal was politics of the SADC sub-
region. Countries should be encouraged to strive to co-operate despite having 
different political views for the sake of human rights protection. 
● The EAC Council should accelerate the process to pass the EAC Bill to effect article 
27(2) of the EAC Treaty.201 The first step of trying to formalise the human rights 
mandate is partly done as the EAC Council has created the Bill but, now it needs to be 
enacted into law. 
● ECCJ has been a better tribunal compared to its counterpart; however, the rate of 
cases dealt with in this court is not satisfactory. Countries in ECOWAS region that 
have not ratified the 2005 Protocol should be encouraged to ratify the protocol to 
avoid backlashes. They also need to commit to enforcing its judgments.  
 
  
                                                          
201 See Article 27(1) of the EAC Treaty 
46 
 
6. Bibliography 
6.1 Articles (journal articles)  
● Kaime Thoko ‘SADC and human rights: fitting human rights into the trade matrix, 
African Security Review, (2004), Vol 1 
● Sisule Fredrick Musungu , Africa Human Rights Law Journal: Economic integration 
and human rights in Africa: a comment on conceptual linkages, (2003), Vol 3  
● Shedrack C Agbakwa, Human Rights and Development Journal: Reclaiming 
Humanity: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African 
Human Rights, (2002)  
● Karen Alter, James Thuo Gathii , Laurence R Helfer,  European Journal of 
International Law : Backlash against international courts in west, east and southern 
Africa: causes and consequences, (2016)  ,Vol 27   
● Sisay Alemahu Yeshanew, African Human Rights Law Journal, (2011) 
● Solomon T Ebobrah, African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 
Litigating human rights before sub-regional courts in Africa: prospects and 
challenges” ,(2009), Vol 17  
● Solomon T Ebobrah, A rights-protection goldmine or a waiting volcanic eruption? 
Competence of, and access to, the human rights jurisdiction of the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice, (2007), Vol 2 
● Solomon T Ebobrah, African Human Rights Law Journal: Human rights 
developments in sub-regional courts in Africa during 2008, (2009), Vol 9  
● Malebakeng Forere , African Human Rights Law Journal :The relationship between 
the right of access to education and work, and sub-regional economic integration in 
Africa, (2011), Vol 11 
● Michelo Hansungule, The Suspension of the SADC Tribunal: Strategic Review for 
Southern Africa, Vol 35 
● Nneoma Nwogu, Regional integration as an instrument of human rights: 
Reconceptualizing ECOWAS,(2007), Vol 6  
● Bahame Tom Nyanduga, Perspectives on the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the entry into force of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, (2006), Vol 2 
● Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Netherlands International Law Review : The Influence of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa,  
(2017), Vol 64 
47 
 
● Lucyline Nkatha Murungi, Revisiting the role of sub-regional courts in the protection 
of human rights in Africa, (2009) 
● Moses Retselisitsoe Phooko, Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad (PER),No 
longer in suspense: Clarifying the human rights jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal, 
(2015), Vol.18  
● Lucyline Nkatha Murungi and Jacqui Gallineti, International Journal on Human 
Rights: The Role of  Sub-Regional Court in the African Human Rights System,(2010) 
● Ally Possi, African Human Rights Law Journal, Striking a balance between 
community norms and human rights: The continuing struggle of the East African 
Court of Justice, (2015), Vol 15. 
● Jephias MapuvaI; Loveness Muyengwa-MapuvaII, The SADC regional bloc: What 
challenges and prospects for regional integration?, (2014), Vol.18   
● Oliver C Ruppel, Regional economic communities and human rights in East and 
Southern Africa, (2009). 
● Solomon T Ebobrah, Research Partnership 1: A critical analysis of the human rights 
mandate of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, (2008) 
● Enyinna Nwauche, African Human Rights Law Journal: The ECOWAS Community 
Court of Justice and the horizontal application of human rights (2013), Vol 1 
 
6.2 Books 
● Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007)  
● Karen Alter,  International Court Authority :The ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice: A Dual Mandate with a Skewed Authority(2018)  
● Lucyline Nkatha Murungi, Revisiting the role of sub-regional courts in the protection 
of human rights in Africa, (2009) 
● Chris Maine Peter, The Protectors: Human Rights Commissions and Accountability 
in East Africa, (2008)  
● Solomon T Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts in Africa: 
Prospects and Challenges, (2007) 
● Wauna Oluoch “The East Africa Court of Justice: review of its composition, 
administration and jurisdiction” in Reinforcing judicial and legal institutions: Kenya 
and regional perspectives, (2007) Vol. 5  
48 
 
● Patrick Capps, Malcolm Evans and Stratos Konstadinidis, Asserting Jurisdiction, 
(2006) 
● Bin Cheng, General Principles of law as applied by international courts and tribunals 
(2006) 
● Simbarashe Tembo, The Human Rights Jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal and the 
East African Court of Justice: Legal and Political implications, (2006), Abstract V 
● Krzysztof Skubiszewski, ‘Implied Powers of International Organisations : in 
International Law at a Time of Perplexity, (1989) 
 
6.3 Case Law 
● African Network for Animal Welfare (ANAW) v The Attorney General of Tanzania 
(Ref No 9 of 2010) Judgement delivered on 20 June 2014 
● Anyang Nyong’o and Others v Attorney General of Kenya Reference No 1 of 2006 
Ruling (EACJ, February 2007) 
● Barry L.T Gondo and Others v Zimbabwe SADC (T) 05/2008 decision rendered 9 
December 2010 
● Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group 
International (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya, Communication No. 
276/03, 27th Activity Report, 25 November 2009, para. 294  
● Chief Ebrimah Manneh v The Republic of The Gambia ECW/CCJ/APP/04/07 
Judgment on 5 June 2008  
● Olajide Afolabi v Nigeria (2004)ECW/CCJ/JUD/01/04 
● Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others (CCT 101/12) [2013] 
ZACC 22; 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC); 2013 (10) BCLR 1103 (CC) (27 June 2013) 
● Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick & others (657/11) [2012] ZASCA 
122 (20 SEPTEMBER 2012) 
● Institute for Human Rights and Development and Others v Democratic Republic of 
Congo Communication No. 393/10 
● Katabazi v Secretary General of the East African Community (Ref No 1 of 2007) 2007 
EACJ 3 (1 November 2007 
● Kenya African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, 
ACtHPR, Application No. 006/2012 (2017) 
● Louis Karel Fick v The Republic of Zimbabwe 01/2010 SADCT 8 (16 July 2010). 
49 
 
● Fick and Others v Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Case No 77881/2009, 
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, 25 February 2010, unreported case. 
● Manariyo Desire v Attorney General of Burundi (Ref No 8 of 2015) 2015 EACJ (2 
December 2016) 
● Mike Campbell (Pvt) LTD and Others v Zimbabwe SADC (T) 2/2007 
● Mr Chude Mba v The Republic of Ghana ECW/CCJ/APP/01/13 
● Open Society Justice Initiative v. Côte d’Ivoire, Communication No. 318/06, 17th 
Extraordinary Session, 19-28 February 2015, para. 183 
● Saidykhan v The Gambia ECW/CCJ/RUL/05/09,30 June 2009 
● SERAP v Federal Government of Nigeria Suit No ECW/CCJ/APP/12/07Judgment No: 
ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/10 case decision made on 30 November 2010 
● SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09 Judgment No: 
ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12 Judgment on 14 December 2012 
● P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the 
European Union and Commission of the European Communities Joined Cases C-
402/05 P and C-415/05  
● Moukhtar Ibrahim Aminu vs Government of Jigawa State of Nigeria and Others Suit 
No. ECW/CCJ/APP/02/11 
● East African Law Society and Others v Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya 
and Others (Ref. No. 3 of 2007) [2008] EACJ 1 (1 September 2008) 
● Sikiru Alade vs Federal Republic of Nigeria  ECW/CCI/ APP/05/ 
● Tandja v Djibo and Another ECW/CCJ/APP/05/10 
 
    6.4 Treaties and Protocols 
● SADC Treaty (1992) 
● SADC Protocol (2014) 
● EAC Treaty (as amended on 14th December 2006 and 20th August 2007) 
● Revised ECOWAS Treaty (2010) 
● ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol (2005) 
● Banjul Charter (1986) 
● UN Charter (1945) 
● Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (2012) 
50 
 
● Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial  Discrimination (ICERD, 
December, 1965); 
● International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR December, 1966);  
● International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 
December, 1966); 
● Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW, December, 1979);  
● Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT, December, 1984); 
● Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, November, 1989);  
● International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (ICMW, December, 1990)  
● International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (CPED, December, 2006) and   
● Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, December, 2006) 
● Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 
● Universal Declaration 
● Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 
 
6.5      Links  
● http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=425:chief-registrar-calls-for-the-review-of-the-enforcement-mechanism-for-
decisions-of-ecowas-court 
● https://africanlii.org/article/20180823/bring-back-sadc-tribunal-says-judge 
● http://punchng.com/dont-disregard-our-decisions-ecowas-court-begs-nigeria-14-
others-2/ 
● http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf 
● https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Is-Ghana-in-double-
standards-in-submission-to-regional-courts-605534 
● https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018 
● http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2011/76.pdf 
● https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40277f504.html 
● http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0402:EN:HTML 
51 
 
● https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Is-Ghana-in-double-
standards-in-submission-to-regional-courts-605534 
● https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf 
● http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf 
● http://documentation.ecowas.int/legal-documents/protocols/ 
● http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/protocols/Supplement
ary%20Protocol%20Amending%20the%20Preamble.pdf 
● http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Revised-treaty.pdf 
● https://hrbaportal.org/faq/what-is-the-relationship-between-human-rights-and-
economic-growth 
● http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf 
● https://africanlii.org/article/20180823/bring-back-sadc-tribunal-says-judge 
●  http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2013/22.html 
 
 
 
 
 
